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Abstract 
The need for more efficiency in military organizations 
is growing. It is expected that a significant increase in 
efficiency can be obtained by an integration of commu- 
nication and information technology. This integration 
may result in (sub)systems that are fully automated, 
i.e., systems that are unmanned, including unmanned 
vehicles. In this paper, we focus on the automation of 
air defence systems! in which integration of commu- 
nication and information technology is a major issue. 
We propose an architecture, in which each weapon 
system has the capability to control itself, whilst act- 
ing in a co-ordinated manner with other systems. To 
realise this task, a weapon system is exactly informed 
about the activities of all other weapon systems. In 
our architecture, the role of the men is reduced to the 
supervision of weapon systems. 
1 Introduction 
While communication technology is an integral part of 
military systems, the potentials of information tech- 
nology have recently been recognized by military or- 
ganizations. Since it has been demonstrated that in- 
formation technology provides the possibility to facil- 
itate or to automate a wide variety of tasks that are 
currently performed by military experts, military or- 
ganizations are rapidly adopting this technology. Ex- 
ploiting information technology may lead to a decrease 
in the number of military personnel required for such 
tasks, and to an increase of the efficiency in military 
organizations. In [5, 61, the need for more efficiency 
in military organizations has been discussed. It is ex- 
pected that a further increase in efficiency can be ob- 
tained by the integration of communication and in- 
formation technology. This integration may result in 
(sub)systems that are fully automated, i.e., systems 
that are unmanned, including unmanned vehicles. 
We are interested in the application of informa- 
tion and communication technology and in the im- 
*This research has been performed within the scope of the 
NATO SHORAD/VSHORAD Feasibility Study in the Matra 
BAe Dynamics consortium. 
pact of these technologies on air defence systems. An 
air defence system has as goal the defence of a pre- 
defined space against physical attack and espionage 
from the air. To realise this task, air defence sys- 
tems are equipped with a wide variety of means, such 
as men, weapons, vehicles, sensors, etc. On the ba- 
sis of the size of the space that should be defended, 
iYAT0 dist,inguishes four categories of air defence sys- 
tems namely, very short range air defence systems 
(vshorad), short range air defence systems (shorad), 
medium range air defence systems, and air defence 
fighters. Very short range air defence systems defend 
spaces that range up to 6 kilometres in a horizontal 
direction and up to 3 kilometres in a vertical direction. 
For short range air defence systems these sizes are 12 
and 6 kilometres in horizontal and vertical direction 
respectively. For longer distances the remaining cate- 
gories are used. 
In this paper, we focus on the automation of 
vshorad and shorad systems. Apart from military ex- 
perts, these systems basically consist of a set of sensors 
and a set of kill vehicles, which may be located on geo- 
graphically different bases. Sensors are used to detect 
incoming targets and to track these targets. Kill ve- 
hicles are assigned to destroy targets. A combination 
of sensors and kill vehicles is called a weapon system, 
and a shorad/vshorad system can be regarded as a set 
of weapon systems that are controlled by military ex- 
perts. Each weapon system is dedicated to the defence 
of a part of the space assigned to a vshorad/shorad 
system. 
We propose an architecture, referred to as dis- 
tributed architecture, in which each weapon system 
has the capability to control itself in a co-ordinated 
manner. This architecture is based on two principles. 
First, each weapon system has access to the same set 
of data and the same capabilities to process this data. 
Second, each weapon’ and sensor knows the strategies 
that are used to deploy sensors to observe an area, 
i.e., a part of the airspace, and to allocate weapons 
to targets. For example, strategies for sensor deploy- 
ment and weapon allocation may be that an area is 
‘In the following, the terms weapon and kill vehicle are used 
interchangeably. 
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observed by the closest located sensor and a target is 
attacked by the closest located weapons, respectively. 
These principles have as consequence that each sensor 
or weapon may know exactly what all other sensors 
and weapons are doing in the system, and can act in 
a co-ordinated manner. In our architecture, the role 
of the men is reduced to the supervision and mainte- 
nance of the system. 
The distributed architecture is only viable if the 
technology to handle the two principles is sufficiently 
mature, and we believe that this is the case. To handle 
the first aspect of the first principle, that is, to pro- 
vide each weapon system the access to the same set 
of data, we propose a network to which all entities, 
including other sensors and weapons, are connected. 
Each sensor/weapon or other connected entity is able 
to extract data from the net, and is able to request net 
capacity (bandwidth/time slots) in order to put data 
on the net. The acceptance of the request and the 
capacity that will be allocated to an entity depends 
on the load of the network and on the importance of 
the data for other entities. So, dynamic allocation of 
net capacity is the proposed solution. 
To handle the second aspect of the first princi- 
ple, that is, to provide processing capabilities to each 
weapon system, the architecture should be equipped 
with algorithms to perform the tasks that are required 
for (very) short range air defence, such as data fusion, 
threat evaluation, weapon allocation, etc. In the liter- 
ature, a wide variety of potential algorithms has been 
reported to perform these tasks, see [2, 3, 6, 91. We 
propose a framework in which many of these algo- 
rithms can be captured. In this framework, we dis- 
tinguish a pool of algorithmic skeletons and a pool of 
logical operators. An algorithmic skeleton consists of 
important control statements. By combining opera- 
tors and algorithmic skeletons, an algorithm can be 
generated for a specific task. 
It is clear that the second principle, i.e., each 
weapon system knows the strategies for sensor de- 
ployment and weapon allocation, can be handled with 
above-mentioned techniques as well. 
The main advantages of our architecture are per- 
formance and reliability. Performance is achieved by 
the fact that a weapon system has its own processing 
capabilities and the possibility to load and organize 
data in an efficient way. Note, that a bad organization 
of data may lead to a poor performance of an over- 
all system [l]. Reliability is achieved by the fact that 
each weapon system is informed about each other’s ac- 
tivities, which avoids situations that a target is over- 
killed, or, even worse, that a target is not attacked at 
all. Other nice properties of the architecture are that 
it supports modularity and graceful degradation. We 
note that these latter two properties are also inherent 
to an autonomous architecture. The main difference 
between our architecture and systems based on an au- 
tonomous architecture, such as the US FAAD system, 
is that in the latter architecture weapon systems are 
not informed about each other’s activities. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
in Section 2, we discuss the distributed architecture 
in more detail. Since communication and processing 
algorithms play a major role in this architecture, the 
two consecutive sections 3 and 4 are devoted to them. 
Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 5. 
2 Distributed Architecture 
Our framework to automate air defence systems is 
based on the concept that each weapon system has 
the capability to control itself in a coordinated man- 
ner. Therefore, we propose an architecture in which 
all entities are connected to a network. As soon as 
an entity obtains new information/data, it puts it on 
the network. All other entities have the possibility to 
access this information/data. In order to realize that 
entities act in a coordinated manner, all entities have 
the same processing algorithms. So, processing of the 
same data will result in the same results at each entity, 
given instantaneous differences due to time delays. 
The entities that are distinguished for the time- 
being are weapon systems and command centres. The 
basic architecture is depicted in Figure 1. 
A weapon system consists of a set of kill vehicles 
and a set of sensors. Communication between kill ve- 
hicles and/or sensors is realised through the network. 
Typical information that will be put on the net by 
kill vehicles are plans to attack a target. Sensors will 
put measurements performed in the real world on the 
network. 
A command centre is hierarchically organised, con- 
sisting of three levels. A battalion at the highest level 
controls a set of batteries, and a battery in its turn 
controls a set of platoons. Each level is connected 
to the network. So, information from the battalion 
destinated for a battery can also be obtained by a 
platoon. Although each entity in a specific level has 
all available information and processing capabilities 
to take justified decisions, the reason to preserve the 
hierarchical organization in command centres is that 
a higher level echelon should have the possibility to 
overrule a decision at a lower level echelon. 
The different levels in a command centre are distin- 
guished by the functions that are performed at each 
level. While the tasks to be performed at higher levels 
are strategical in character, at lower levels the tasks 
are more tactical. For example, a battalion is also 
connected with external systems and it may receive 
recognised air picture data from these systems. It is 
the responsibility of the battalion to select and dis- 
tribute proper data to all entities through the net- 
work. At platoon level, weapons are commanded to 
attack a target. 
The major advantages of distributing data to all 
entities through a network are reliability and perfor- 
mance. Reliability is achieved by the fact that each 
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Figure 1: Basic architecture 
tities and that each entity is capable to obtain and 
process data. By informing entities about their activ- 
ities, situations of over-kill or not engaging a target 
can be avoided. For example: suppose that wi is the 
most obvious weapon to engage a target, but is unable 
to fulfil this task for some reason. Since the second ob- 
vious weapon, let’s say ws, can observe that wi is not 
going to engage the target, ws knows that it should 
engage the target. 
additional advantage of providing each entity process- 
ing facilities is that graceful degradation is supported. 
This means that if some entit,ies are completely de- 
stroyed, the other entities can still perform their tasks. 
Since an enormous amount of data may Aow 
through the network, congestion of the network is an 
obvious possibility in this architecture. In the next 
section, we describe a method to prevent and to cope 
with congestion. 
By providing each entity processing capability, en- 
tities become independent of each other. So, they do 
not suffer from entities that fail to perform process- 
ing tasks. Let us consider the following situation for 
track correlation. Suppose that only one entity is able 
to perform track correlation and is also responsible 
for putting updated tracks on the network. If  this en- 
tity fails to perform this task, then the entities have 
an obsolete track. Furthermore, the measurements 
provided by sensors in this case can be considered 
as a waste of effort. Another advantage of provid- 
ing processing capability to each entity is that even 
if an entity fails to process some data, it still can ob- 
tain the results of processing, since other entities have 
processed the data, and may put it on the net. 
3 Communication 
In the proposed architecture (Figure l), relevant data 
need to be shared between entities in an “all know 
everything” setup. Therefore data generated by one 
entity (e.g. relating to the detection of air targets by 
a sensor) should be available nearly instantaneously 
throughout the system, e.g., for track correlation, 
multi-sensor data fusion, threat evaluation, etc. This 
obviously calls for high-capacity data transmission 
between the system’s elements. However, in multi- 
element wireless communication, capacity usually is 
limited. 
Performance is achieved by the fact that there is A military network’s data throughput capacity is 
a minimum delay in obtaining data, since all data is embodied in time slots and frequencies/bandwidths 
freely available. Since each entity has its own process- embedded in a cyclic framework. A well-known repre- 
ing facilities, the queues for processing an amount of sentation (derived from the system Link-16 protocols) 
data will be much shorter compared to the situation, is shown in Figure 2. At the setup of such a (secure) 
in which there would be one processing unit and each communications network, each element is allotted an 
entity was assigned to this unit. Furthermore, process- appropriate number of slots within the cycle in which 
ing algorithms may be tuned towards the tasks that it may transmit, at the prescribed hopping frequen- 
should be performed by an entity, e.g., by incorporat- cies. In practice, this method leads to non-optimal 
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Figure 2: Cyclic representation of frequency bands vs. time slots 
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tern elements regardless of the volume of data gener- 
ated and also regardless of the relevance of such data 
to the task. E.g., sensors having nothing of interest 
to report still consume part of the communications 
capacity. 
In a typical air assault scenario, some entities (e.g. 
the upfront sensors) may generate lots of relevant data 
as they “see” many new targets. Such information 
may consist of track data as well as of signature char- 
acteristics. If the number of t,ransmission slots origi- 
nally allotted to those sensors is insufficient for trans- 
mission of all of the relevant information, optimal ap- 
plication of net,work capacity requires allocation of ex- 
tra resources for the timely dispersion of such data. 
A method of optimizing transmission capacity in 
a distributed network is proposed here. It is called 
the dynamic allocation of slots, frequencies and band- 
widths. In this method, each system element requiring 
to transmit extra data first submits a transmission re- 
quest comprising a weighted assessment of the urgency 
of its data. Since in the proposed architecture knowl- 
edge is dispersed throughout the system and entities 
possess the intelligence to decide whether the infor- 
mation they generate merits putting it on the net, 
the assessment of urgency can be made. Typical pa- 
rameters that play a role in such an assessment are 
new target recognition results, optimum kill probabil- 
ity, time left to last launch opportunity, value of the 
threatened asset, etcetera. The extra slots (frequen- 
cies, bandwidths) are allocated dynamically, through 
a distributed management function and in proportion 
to the “weights” of the current requests. This ap- 
proach is thought to be feasible, since successful time 
sharing schemes for mainframe computer operating 
systems are based on a similar concept. We further 
believe the method is promising, as it may generate a 
more efficient application of a scarce commodity. 
We note that the proposed method should be com- 
plementary applied to (existing) data compressing 
techniques. It has been proven that data compressing 
techniques may considerably reduce a piece of data 
that should be transmitted. Once the transmitted 
data has been received, it may be decompressed such 
that the semantic of the original data is preserved. 
4 Processing algorithms 
In Figure 1, it is depicted that processing algorithms 
are required by weapon systems as well as by com- 
mand centres. Within a command centre algorithms 
are required at all levels for various tasks. Typical 
tasks that may be performed by algorithms are track 
filtering and correlation (in order to produce air pic- 
tures), identification, threat evaluation, weapon allo- 
cation, etc. While some of these tasks should be per- 
formed by most entities and at each level, other tasks 
are performed just at some levels within a command 
centre. For example, an air picture is built up by 
all entities and on each level. Therefore, all entities 
and all levels should be equipped with track filtering, 
correlation, and data fusion algorithms. Intelligence 
gathering is a task that will typically be performed 
at battery and/or battalion level. So algorithms that 
support this task should be installed at these levels. 
Many algorithms reported in the literature can be 
used to perform a wide range of tasks required for air 
defence systems. As an example, let us consider the 
task of track filtering and potentially useful algorithms 
for this task that can be found in text books. The 
core of track filtering is deciding whether a point is 
within or outside a polygon. Track filtering provides 
the possibility to remove air tracks that are outside a 
geographical area of interest. 
Possible solutions for track filtering might be based 
on, e.g.! point inclusive algorithms or nearest neigh- 
bour algorithms. The idea behind point inclusive al- 
gorithms is to draw a vertical or horizontal line from 
a point to the polygon, while counting the number of 
intersections between the line and the polygon. An 
even number of intersections implies that the point 
is outside the polygon, while an odd number implies 
that the point is inside the polygon. Intersections that 
are also a point of contact are counted as two intersec- 
tions. The idea behind nearest neighbour algorithms 
is to assign a point to the most likely polygon. There- 
fore, these algorithms compute for all (relevant) poly- 
gons the probability that a point is within a polygon. 
What algorithm to select for a task depends on the 
characteristics of the task and the available input. In 
general, each algorithm will have its own strong and 
weak points. For example, a point inclusive algorithm 
may be very fast, but on the other hand, it requires a 
detailed geometrical description of the polygon. 
In the next section, we propose a framework that 
captures a wide variety of algorithms that may be used 
for several tasks by air defence systems. 
4.1 Framework 
Our main goal is to develop and implement algo- 
rithms that may be used for several air defence tasks. 
It has been widely recognised that the development 
of software for complex systems is a tough process. 
Therefore, several methodologies have been devel- 
oped to facilitate this task at various levels, ranging 
from the design to the implementation. For example, 
data-driven, object-oriented, and top-down functional 
methodologies are well known at the design level, and 
for programming purposes the top-down and bottom- 
up methodologies are well known. Depending on the 
nature of an application, software engineers choose a 
number of these methodologies to develop software. 
For the software development of the proposed air de- 
fence system architecture, we will not design software 
from scratch but attempt to tailor existing algorithms 
for various functions. In general, the pseudo-code of 
these algorithms can be found in textbooks. Tailoring 
an algorithm to a function boils down to, e.g., 
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. Verifying whether the assumptions on which an 
algorithm is based are realistic for the function or 
not, e.g., is the input expected by the algorithm 
available? 
. What is the best way to represent the input for 
the algorithm? The representation should be 
such that it fits the problem domain, i.e.: the 
problem that should be solved by the function. 
. Are all operators in the algorithm meaningful? If 
not, should they be modified, or deleted? 
. Are the control statements in the algorithm 
meaningful or should they be modified, or 
deleted? 
. How should the output be represented? 
We note that performing the above-mentioned tasks 
successfully requires advanced skills of a software en- 
gineer. 
On the one hand, we have observed that several 
(textbook) algorithms might be used for a specific air 
defence task, while on the other hand an algorithm 
might be used for several air defence tasks. For ex- 
ample, a point inclusive algorithm as well as a nearest 
neighbour algorithm can be used for track filtering, 
while the latter algorithm can also be used for iden- 
tification and threat evaluation. Our goal is to come 
up with a set of algorithms such that a single algo- 
rithm might be used for several air defence systems 
tasks on the one hand and on the other hand, we pre- 
fer to have several algorithms available to perform a 
task. To realise this goal, we suggest to implement a 
set of algorithmic skeletons and a set of operators. In 
an algorithmic skeleton, important control statements 
are implemented and operators are implemented in an 
abstract way. In a separate pool, operators are imple- 
mented in more detail. An operator describes how ob- 
jects should be represented and what its impact will 
be on each object. Once these two sets are available, 
a user may construct its own algorithms by combin- 
ing skeletons and operators. In this way, we re-use 
software as much as possible. 
We note that for many textbook algorithms the dis- 
tinction between algorithmic skeletons and operators 
can easily be made. Observe that an algorithm can be 
regarded as an ordered list of control statements and 
operations. 
Once an algorithm has been constructed by com- 
bining operators with an algorithmic skeleton, this al- 
gorithm has to be instantiated. This means that val- 
ues for the input parameters should be made available 
to the algorithm. Then, the algorithm can be com- 
piled and executed. In Figure 3, the whole process is 
depicted. 
The main advantage of our framework is that there 
are several alternative algorithms to perform a task, 
each with its own strong and weak points. If the result 
of an algorithm is unsatisfactory, one may assemble 
another algorithm. 
4.2 An example 
In this section, we illustrate our framework by means 
of a simplified identification algorithm. Identifica- 
tion algorithms collect data/evidences from multiple 
sources and combine these data in order to produce 
a composite identification of an object. Potential 
sources of data include recognised air pictures, pro- 
cedural indicators (e.g., restricted area violations), 
acoustic sources, etc. 
In our example! the goal is to determine what ob- 
jects are in the airspace on the basis of a sequence of 
independent evidences. To solve this problem, we will 
discuss two techniques that might be used namely, one 
emanated from probability theory [7] and the other 
emanated from Dempster-Shafer theory [8]. Both the- 
ories provide us a tool to combine several bodies of 
evidence. For the similarities and differences between 
these theories, we refer to [4]. In the following, we will 
stress the combination of evidences. 
In the airspace, we want to distinguish between 
civil aircraft, military aircraft; and birds. The set 
D = {civil aircraft7 military aircraft, bird} is called 
the frame of discernment. As time went on, evidences 
will be collected that support or reject a subset of D. 
Let D’ C D, and P(D’len) be the probability in 
D’ given a sequence of ei, e2, es, . . . . e, evidences. To 
update the probability in D’, whenever a new body of 
evidence e becomes available, the following formulae 
can be used according to probability theory. 
and 
P(W) 




Note that in the formula above we assumed that evi- 
dences are independent of each other. 
Before introducing the rule to combine evidences 
according to the Dempster-Shafer theory, we intro- 
duce the notion of basic probability assignment. ,4 
basic probability assignment to a set D’, m(D’) can 
be regarded as the measure of belief that is exactly 
committed to D’. A basic probability assignment 
should satisfy the following properties m(0) = 0 and 
c D,CDm(D') = 1. 
Let men (.) be the basic probability assignment in- 
duced by a sequence of evidences ei , e2, es, . . . . e,. To 
update the belief in a set D’, whenever a new body 
of evidence e becomes available the following formula 
can be used. 
menem, = K-l c men (Dh (Dj) 
. 
Din;;;= D’ 
in which D’ is a non empty set, Di, Dj C D, and 
K= c me,, (DJm,(Dj) 
. . 
Di n’iff # 8 
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Figure 3: Framework to capture algorithms 
We note that K is a normalization constant and is 
required to meet the property m(0) = 0. 
Each of the above mentioned techniques can be im- 
plemented as a separate combination operator. Let 
our pool of operators consists of Combine-Prob, which 
is based on probability theory and Combine-DS, which 
is based on Dempster-Shafer theory. 
Assume that the following algorithmic skeleton is 
available, in which a Combine operator appears. 
that the a priori probabilities P(e) and the a poste- 
riori probabilities P(elD’), in which D’ E {civil air- 
craft, military aircraft, bird} and the goal is to identify 
whether an object is a bird, a civil or a military air- 
craft. Then, the above mentioned skeleton together 
with the CombineDS operator can be used for this 
purpose. Now the identification program will be 
Program Identification(D, Var Conch); 
Get(e); 
Program Skeleton(D, Var Conch); 
Get(e); /* Get reads a body of evidence /* 
first-evidence := ‘true’; 
while e # “ do 
j:= 0; 
while j < 2O do 
first-evidence := ‘true’; 
while e # “ do 
j:= 0; 
while j < 2O do 
Combine(D’[j], first-evidence, e, Conch); 
/* Combine updates the belief/ 








if first-evidence = ‘true’ 
then first-evidence := ‘false’; 
od; 
end. 
if first-evidence = ‘true’ 
then first-evidence := ‘false’; Once we have specified the input values, i.e., D, 
od; the required probabilities, the program is instantiated 
end. and ready for execution. 
This skeleton requires as input a frame of discernment 
D, e.g., D = {civil aircraft, military aircraft, bird}. 
The output, referred to as Conclusion, will be sub- 
set(s) of D to which a measure is attached expressing 
the belief/likelihood that an object can be identified 
which one of the elements in the subset(s). As long as 
evidences are available, the belief/likelihood in each 
subset D’ C D is updated by the skeleton. Suppose 
We note that if both probabilities P(e) and P(elD’) 
are not available, we have the possibility to build in 
the Combine-DS into the skeleton, resulting in an al- 
ternative identification program. 
Suppose that our pool of operators contains a com- 
bination operator that is able to combine images, i.e., 
a body of evidence results in an image of an environ- 
ment and we are able to combine different images, the 
same skeleton may be used for threat evaluation. 
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Summarising, we propose a framework that con- 
sists of a pool of operators and a pool of algorithmic 
skeletons. rln operator manipulates a number of ob- 
jects according to a certain technique. An algorithmic 
skeleton consists of control statement,s and abstractly 
defined operators. Now, an algorithm may be con- 
structed by combining skeletons with operators. In 
this way, operators and skeletons can be used for sev- 
eral air defence tasks, and several alternatives will be 
available for a single air defence task. 
5 Conclusions & further re- 
search 
We have discussed a framework for the the automa- 
tion of air defence systems. In this framework, the 
integration of information and communication tech- 
nology is a major issue. We have proposed a dis- 
tributed architecture, in which each weapon system 
has the capability to control itself in a co-ordinated 
manner. In this architecture, a weapon system is ex- 
actly informed about the activities of all other weapon 
systems. We have touched on how our architecture 
can be implemented using information and commu- 
nication technology. Communication between entities 
and adequate processing of data by each entity are of 
vital importance. Communication between entitities 
is realised through a communication net, and net ca- 
pacity is dynamically allocated to entities. For the 
processing of data, we have proposed to implement a 
wide variety of algorithmic skeletons and operators. 
An algorithm to perform an air defence task may be 
constructed by combining algorithmic skeletons and 
operators. 
Furthermore, we have discussed the advantages of 
our architecture in relation with other architectures. 
Topics for further research are the implementation 
and evaluation of the architecture. 
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